Attribute based encryption (ABE) is a good way to achieve flexible and secure access control to data, and attribute revocation is the extension of the attribute-based encryption, and the keyword search is an indispensable part for cloud storage. The combination of both has an important application in the cloud storage. In this paper, we construct a searchable attribute-based encryption scheme with attribute revocation in cloud storage, the keyword search in our scheme is attribute based with access control, when the search succeeds, the cloud server returns the corresponding cipher text to user and the user can decrypt the cipher text definitely. Besides, our scheme supports multiple keywords search, which makes the scheme more practical. Under the assumption of decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (q-BDHE) and decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) in the selective security model, we prove that our scheme is secure.
Introduction
In 2005, Waters et al. [1] came up with the concept of ABE(Attribute-Based Encryption) which was much more flexible than traditional public-key encryption. With the development and deepening of ABE, the attribute revocation of ABE is concerned by more and more people. The efficient attributes revocation scheme is an integral part of ABE scheme, which is one of the difficulties for the application of ABE, and the study of ABE is inseparable from the attribute revocation scheme research.
P. Traynor et al. [2] put forward a scheme which achieved the update of secret key in 2006. However, it needed that the user must kept close contact with attribute authority to get the secret key. Thereafter, Kumar et al. [3] presented a scheme with revocation of ABE, and it expanded from the IBE which they proposed before. All of these articles demand that users need to access the attribute authority for key reissuing at regular intervals.
In 2008, Jiang et al. [4] gave a scheme that solved the key misused problem of users. However, in this scheme, the third party should be included in each decryption key of users, and made it was unrealistic. After that, Kim et al. [5] key of attribute by using the black box model and sent it to the user, which was more efficient to guarantee the security of the system. Attrapadung et al. [6] put forward the two revocation models, they are direct revocation model and indirect revocation model. The direct revocation model is specified the revocation list by sender, and the indirect revocation model updates the secret key periodically by the key center. In [7] [8], the authors gave some ABE instances. However, in the above schemes, they do not relate to the keyword search issue, which makes users can not effectively search for files.
To overcome this problem, Boneth et al. [9] proposed a single keyword search scheme, namely the user can only search a single keyword. In this scheme, the data owner extracted the keywords from the file before encrypted, and used the public key to encrypt the keywords. After that, the data owner sent the file and the index of the keywords to the cloud server. The user could generate the search token about the keywords which he wanted to search and sent it to the cloud server. The cloud server used the matching algorithm to find out the cipher text and returned it if the match was successful.
Searchable encryption has many practical applications. In 2011, Kerschbaum et al. [10] proposed a secure conjunctive keyword searches for unstructured text scheme, and the scheme was proved secure in the random oracle model. At the same year, Cao et al. [11] and Chuanh et al. [12] gave schemes that the multi-keyword search over encrypted data.
In 2014, Han et al. [13] proposed an attribute based encryption (ABE) searchable scheme, in which used the homomorphic encryption technology. Sahai et al. [14] gave a outsourcing technique based on the scheme of Gentry et al. [15] . After that, Liang K et al. [16] proposed a searchable ABE mechanism with efficient and secure in cloud storage. This model can be applied to real life, such as the safety of electric power system. And the scheme is secure in the random oracle model. Later, Li et al. [17] proposed a searchable ABE scheme with attribute revocation in cloud storage.
Willy Susilo et al. [18] proposed a searchable scheme, and it supported multiple keywords search. At the same time, Li J et al. [19] made a searchable CP-ABE with revocation. In this scheme, the receivers could not steal any information from the cipher because of the access structures were partially hidden, which made the scheme more secure.
In 2016, Wen et al. [20] proposed a verifiable attribute-based keyword search scheme with fine-grained owner-enforced search authorization in the cloud. This scheme supports user revocation. Besides, it allows data owners encrypt the data and outsource to the cloud server. In the same year, Yang et al. [21] proposed a conjunctive keyword search scheme with designated tester. User can search within a specified time if he is authorized, and it is proved secure in the standard model. In 2017, Jiang et al. [22] proposed a keyword search scheme with efficiency and verification in cloud data, and it allows multi-keyword search. Finally, they gave the security analysis in the scheme. Later, Poon et al. [23] constructed a conjunctive keyword search scheme. This scheme allows phrase search, and has smaller storage cost.
Our contribution
In 2012, Qiang Li et al. [24] put forward a scheme with fine-grained attribute revocation. However, the scheme only achieves the attribute revocation, the keyword search is not involved, this problem may lead to the problem that system users cannot effectively download cipher text which they interested from the cloud server.
In this paper, we propose a keyword search attribute based encryption scheme with attribute revocation. The new scheme supports not only the attribute revocation but also keyword search. When a user wants to search the file which he interests, he sends the search token to the cloud server, and the cloud server runs the test algorithm. If the test is successful, it returns the file. In this way, the user can download the file which he interests and save the storage space at the same time. Finally, under the assumption of q-BDHE and DDH in the selective security model, we prove that our scheme is secure.
Preliminaries
A linear secret sharing scheme can be used to represent an access control policy (M, ρ), which M is an l×k matrix, and S = {att 1 , . . ., att n } be an attribute set, and for i 2 [1,l] , ρ(i) ! S is a mapping function, and ρ(i) maps a row into the attribute.
Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme (LSSS) [25] A linear secret sharing scheme includes two algorithms:
Share: In this step, it is dispersing the secret value s to attributes specified by ρ as follows:
ith row of M,it assigns secrets share λ i to the attribute ρ(i). Combine: In this step, it is used to collect the secret value from secret shares which related to the attributes as follows: selecting subset I = {i: ρ(i) 2 S} the attribute set {ρ(i) | i 2 I} satisfies access control strategy (M, ρ), and computing coefficients
Decisional q-BDHE assumption [24] The definition of the decisional q-BDHE exponent assumption in our article as follows:
Choose a group G 1 of prime order p, let g be a generator of G 1 , and define e: and a random element in G 2 .
Zero Inner-product [24] The ID represents the identity of user which associated with user's private key. Define a vector X = (x 1 ,. . .,
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where, if q + 1 < n, the coordinates y q+2 ,Á Á Á,y n are set to 0. By doing so, we note that
For example, if the user ID 1 in the revoked user set R = {ID 1 , ID 3 }, we have that
Decisional DDH assumption [10] Let G 1 is a group which prime order is p, let g be a generator of Finally, the system model of our scheme is shown in Fig 1. Security model j. Definition 2. We say a searchable encryption article with multiple keywords is secure based on the game IND-CKA, if the advantage of the adversary is negligible in the above game.
Implement of the algorithm
Our construction is based on the Qiang Li et al. [24] , and we combine the keyword search with attribute revocation in our new scheme. User constructs the search token when he wants to search files. If the search is successful and the set of attribute satisfies the access structure, it outputs 1 in the algorithm of Test, then cloud server returns the cipher text. Our scheme adds access control in search, the user can download the files which he interests and can decrypt in this way, and save the space. We construct our scheme as follows:
Setup (λ) ! msk, pp: Give that the G 1 and G 2 are two groups of prime order p, the binary size of p is λ,let g be a generator of G 1 . Define that e: G 1 × G 1 !G 2 . In this paper, we suppose the maximum number of attribute is m when encryption, and n represents the maximum number of revoked user set in the revocation list. Then randomly choose α, β, δ 2 Z p ,
. . . ; g a n Þ T and randomly 
A revocation list R θ U which attribute θ 2 ω. Data owner encrypts the file F which is firstly encrypted by a symmetric encryption algorithm and gets cipher text F Ã , and suppose that the symmetric encryption key is m. The set of keywords W = {w 1 , w 2 ,. . ., w N } is extracted from the F, and randomly choose t 2 Z p ,and output the keywords index Ind ¼< I 0 ; I 1;j ; I 2;0 ; I 2;1 > where 
so that when <X, Y> 6 ¼ 0, and then calculate 
Correctness analyses
In this subsection, we show that our construction is correct with some appropriate parameters setting.
(1) In the process of search the equation holds, it means that cloud server selects N 1 keywords index from the Ind which we denote fI 1 
. . .
. .
. . 
Security analyses
Selective security model proof 
; . . . 
and implicitly has that A = BÁZ + δ where δ 2 
Finally, B gives the public parameters pp ¼< g; eðg; gÞ
The simulator B generates the secret key sk as follows.
(1) When ID = 2 R θ (in this case, we have ω Ã0 = ω Ã ), and ω Ã0 doesn't satisfy the access structure, 
and randomly chooses r i,0 , r i,1 2 Z p and computes that ii. When ρ(i) = 2 ω Ã , B computes that
and randomly chooses r; fr [2,n] , the simulator B can computes 
and computes
Then B sends the challenge ciphertext ct 
IND-CKA security proof Theorem 2. Suppose there exists a polynomial-time adversary A, which can attack our scheme with advantage ε in the IND-CKA model. We can construct a simulator B that can solve the DDH problem in G 1 with probability at lest
, where e is constant, and we assume the adversary A makes M index queries and T search token queries(it contains N 1 keywords) in each phase [10] . Correctness Analyses. In the above simulation scheme, if the adversary A has the advantage of attack our scheme, and then it will be given the keyword w j of hush value is H(w j ) = g a rather than the random value H(w j ) = g aj . Then it can compute that
, and B computes that g c = g ab which means it solves the DDH problem.
Probability Analyses. Suppose that the adversary A makes M index queries and T search token queries in each phase, and the probability that B will not be terminated in two query phases 1 and 2 is s 2ðMþTN 1 Þ , so the probability that it will not terminated during the challenge step is 1 − σ, so that results in an overall probability that B does not abort is s 2ðMþTN 1 Þ Á ð1 À sÞ. And, through the computes that the maximum is s ¼ 1 À 
Performance analyses
In this section, we give some performance analysis in our scheme. The hardware runtime environment is Intel Core i5-3470 CPU @ 3.20GHz, and RAM is 4.00GB. The software runtime environment is JDK 1.7.5, JPBC 2.0.0 and MyEclipse10. Our scheme is compared with the schemes of [21, 24, 26, 27, 28] in Table 1 . Our scheme is also compared with the schemes of [26, 27, 28] in Table 2 . We can see from Table 2 , our scheme has a large amount of computation in the KenGen and Encryption generation, because our scheme doesn't need to update the cipher-text and secret key when attributes revocation. However, the schemes of [26] , [27] and [28] don't achieve the function of attribute revocation.
As is shown in the Fig 2, we suppose that there are 16 attributes in the policy and provide the relational graphs of keywords index building time as is shown in Fig 2(a) and search token building time as is shown in Fig 2(b) . From the Fig 2(a) and 2(b) , we can see that the time cost is nearly linear with the index building and token building. In the Fig 2(c) , we give the relational graph of the number of attributes in the policy and time cost. As is shown in the Fig 2(c) , Searchable attribute-based encryption scheme with attribute revocation in cloud storage we can find that the effect of the increase of the attributes on the time is not particularly evident in our scheme which takes less time than Zhiquan's [29] .
Conclusions
In our scheme, we add the keyword search based on the attribute revocation, the search tokens generated by the attribute authority and the user. The cloud server match is divided into two cases: the user is in the revocation list and not in the revocation list, and the cloud server uses the different test according to the different case. It will return the cipher text when the attribute set meets the access structure and the search keywords exist, and the user can decrypt correctly. This scheme supports multiple keywords search at the same time which makes more flexible in the practical application.
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